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Abstract
Ladies and Gentlemen, at last year’s conference I presented to you a wide variety of ongoing
and proposed reforms with which the European Union intends to meet actual and future challenges
for its competition policy. Today, one year later, we have made considerable progress in many
respects. Most importantly, with our White Paper of 28 April 1999, we have launched the process
for a fundamental reform of the rules implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty establishing
the European Community (‘EC Treaty‘), which are currently laid down in Council Regulation No.
17. Anticipating your expectations and my fellow panelists’ contributions, I will today concentrate
on the reform of Regulation No. 17.
MODERNIZATION OF EC COMPETITION
LAW: REFORM OF REGULATION NO. 17
Dr. Alexander Schaub*
INTRODUCTION
Ladies and Gentlemen, at last year's conference I presented
to you a wide variety of ongoing and proposed reforms with
which the European Union intends to meet actual and future
challenges for its competition policy.' Today, one year later, we
have made considerable progress in many respects. Most impor-
tantly, with our White Paper of 28 April 1999,2 we have launched
the process for a fundamental reform of the rules implementing
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity3 ("EC Treaty"), which are currently laid down in Council
Regulation No. 17.' Anticipating your expectations and my fel-
low panelists' contributions, I will today concentrate on the re-
form of Regulation No. 17.
* Director-General of the Directorate-General Competition of the European Com-
mission. The author wishes to express particular gratitude to Rfidiger Dohms of the
Directorate-General Competition, who made an essential contribution to the prepara-
tion of this Essay.
1. Alexander Schaub, EC Competition System-Proposals for Reform, 1998 Fo~rDAM
Cornu. L. INST. (Barry Hawk ed., 1999).
2. White Paper on Modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 81 (ex 85)
and 82 (ex 86) of the EC Treaty, COM (99) 101 Final (May 1999). Also published on
the World Wide Web under <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg4/entente/
other.htm#dgivpdLwbmodernisation>.
3. Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719
[hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty on European Union ("TEU") amended the Treaty es-
tablishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [here-
inafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA]. The Treaty establishing the European Community
("EC Treaty") was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related
acts, Oct. 2, 1997, Oj. C 340/1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. These
amendments were incorporated into the EC Treaty, and the articles of the EC Treaty
were renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European
Community, Oj. C 340/3 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 79 [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty],
incorporating changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra; Consolidated EC Treaty, supra,
art. 81-82, O.J. C 340/3, at 208-09 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 93-94 (ex Articles 85-86).
4. See Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13J.O. 204 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-
62, at 87 (citing first regulation implementing Articles 81 (ex 85) and 82 (ex 86) of EC
Treaty).
REFORM OF REGULATION NO. 17
I. WHY DO WE NEED A REFORM OF REGULATION NO. 17?
The present system for the implementation of Articles 81
and 82 was established by Regulation No. 17 in 1962 and has
been substantially unchanged ever since. With regard to control
of restrictive agreements, the prohibition under Article 81(1)
can be applied not only by the European Commission ("Com-
mission"), but also by national competition authorities and na-
tional courts. However, only the Commission is empowered to
grant exemptions for notified agreements on the basis of Article
81(3). This has led to a highly centralized notification and au-
thorization system, which was certainly useful in the early years.
However, already today it no longer ensures satisfactory protec-
tion of competition and it would certainly not meet the chal-
lenges of the future. The major shortcomings of the current sys-
tem are its inefficiency and the insufficient involvement of na-
tional authorities and courts in the enforcement of the
European Community (or "EC") competition rules. Both as-
pects have a negative impact on the effective protection of com-
petition and this is the central reason why we are now proposing
a fundamental reform. Our experience has shown that the noti-
fication system hardly contributes to the protection of competi-
tion: in thirty-seven years of Regulation No. 17, only nine formal
prohibition decisions have emerged from pure notification
cases, i.e., cases in which there was no additional complaint. The
substantial number of notifications, which in their large majority
do not pose significant competition problems, does however dis-
tract the Commission from pursuing grave infringements of
competition law, particularly those that are never notified.
At this point, it is important to understand that the princi-
pal motivation behind our reform project is not the workload as
such that the notification system creates for the Commission. It
is rather the fact that a substantial part of the Commission's re-
sources is tied up in a notification business that does not essen-
tially contribute to the protection of competition. Since the
Commission's competition resources will always be limited, effi-
ciency considerations now make it imperative to concentrate
them fully on serious infringements that are pursued in ex officio
and complaint procedures.
In the same spirit of improving the protection of competi-
tion, we find it untenable that the Commission's exemption mo-
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nopoly continues to block the appropriate participation of na-
tional authorities and courts in the enforcement of Article 81.
This is deplorable since the institutional and factual precondi-
tions for a successful enforcement of the EC competition rules at
the Member State level have remarkably improved in the last
decade. It is therefore now possible to have more EC competi-
tion cases decided by national bodies that are nearer to the mar-
kets and the people concerned. This will improve acceptance of
competition policy among the citizens and contribute to devel-
oping a common competition culture throughout the Commu-
nity. In any event, the centralized system created by Regulation
No. 17 in 1962 for a Community of 6 Member States with 170
million inhabitants and 4 working languages is now, after several
enlargements and progressive integration of markets, no longer
appropriate for a Community of 15 Member States with 380 mil-
lion inhabitants and 11 official languages. The imminent fur-
ther enlargement to a Community of 20-25 or even 30 Member
States now makes a fundamental reform of Regulation No. 17
inevitable if we want to maintain a workable system and to en-
sure the effective protection of competition.
In summary, our philosophy, which by the way not only ap-
plies to the reform of Regulation No. 17 but also to other
projects that we have started in the last few years, can be summa-
rized as follows:
* the Commission must concentrate on the really impor-
tant cases;
* national authorities and courts must get seriously in-
volved in the enforcement of the EC competition rules;
* procedures must be simplified and to become less bu-
reaucratic;
* a uniform and coherent application of the EC rules must
be ensured;
* an adequate level of legal certainty must be maintained.
II. OPTIONS FOR REFORM OF REGULATION NO. 17
How best to achieve these objectives with regard to the im-
plementation of Articles 81 and 82 has been intensely discussed
in the Directorate-General for Competition over the last three
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years. At this point, I would like to concentrate on the most im-
portant options.
A. The First Option
The first option is to maintain a system of notification and
authorization, but to abolish the Commission's exemption mo-
nopoly and to share the power to grant constitutive exemptions
between the Commission and national competition authorities.
Cases would be allocated between the different authorities ac-
cording to the center of gravity criterion: Where the center of
gravity of the effects of a restrictive agreement is confined to one
Member State, the competition authority of that State is compe-
tent for dealing with a notification and deciding upon the ex-
emption. All other cases are examined and decided by the Com-
mission.
In our view, this option is not convincing for several rea-
sons:
" First, the overall number of notifications would not be
reduced, but merely distributed between competition
authorities. The number of notifications would possibly
even increase.
" Second, the vast majority of notifications would remain
uninteresting and distract the Commission and national
authorities from pursuing more serious infringements.
Thus, the inefficiency of the notification system would
be spread to national authorities instead of allowing
them and the Commission to overcome their reactive
position and to adopt a pro-active approach.
" Third, in view of the increasing integration of markets
across national borders, the potential for decentralizing
a notification and authorization system is limited. The
effect of an exemption decision issued by a national au-
thority is limited to that Member State and will not sat-
isfy companies seeking legal security in all the Member
States where the agreement is intended to operate. In-
stead of filing multiple notifications with several national
authorities, companies rather will notify with the Com-
mission.
" Fourth, the center of gravity criterion is too vague, given
2000]
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the fact that important legal consequences such as im-
munity from fines and exemption retroactivity are con-
nected with the act or date of notification.
" Fifth, those Member States that currently have no notifi-
cation system (such as France or Luxembourg) would be
obliged to establish one. This would mean complication
of procedures and more bureaucracy instead of simplifi-
cation of procedures and less bureaucracy.
* Sixth, a particular weakness of this option would be that
any administrative authorization system prevents na-
tional courts from applying Article 81 in its entirety. In-
asmuch as a restrictive agreement would have been noti-
fied and an exemption could not be definitely ruled out,
national courts would remain obliged to stay their pro-
ceedings until the Commission or the national authority
had decided upon the application of Article 81(3). This
would impede the practical effectiveness of private ac-
tion as a means of protecting competition as well as indi-
vidual rights.
* Finally, this option would contain special dangers for
uniformity and coherence, since national authorities in
their exemption practice could be tempted to treat do-
mestic companies more leniently than the Commission
would do.
B. A Second Model
During the discussions, a second model has emerged. It
would maintain an administrative notification and authorization
system, either in its current centralized form or with decentrali-
zation towards the national authorities, and combine this model
with simplification of procedures and possibly an extension of
the waiver of prior notification under Article 4(2) of Regulation
No. 17 to all agreements. The general rule under Regulation
No. 17 is that exemptions cannot take effect for the time before
the notification of the agreement, while for agreements falling
under Article 4(2) the exemption can be backdated to the day of
conclusion of this agreement. In the course of reforming our
policy on vertical restraints, we have extended Article 4(2) to all
vertical agreements. The aim was to avoid damage for those
companies that at the moment of concluding their agreement
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erroneously thought they were covered by the market share-
based group exemption regulation and therefore had refrained
from prophylactically notifying for an individual exemption.
Upon later discovering that such notification was necessary, they
would not have been able to avoid a period of incurable nullity
between the date of conclusion of the agreement and the date of
its notification. That is the reason why, with effect from June 18,
1999, Article 4(2) of Regulation No. 17 was extended so as to
cover all vertical agreements5.
Nevertheless, for several reasons we do not think that the
further extension of Article 4(2) to all (i.e., including horizontal
agreements) would be a general and sustainable solution:
" First, even agreements falling under Article 4(2) would
have to be notified to the Commission, or a national
competition authority in the decentralized system, if and
when the question of their exemptability is raised, such
as in a prohibition procedure before a national authority
or in litigation before a national court.
* Second, companies could continue to notify prophylacti-
cally to the Commission or to national authorities, thus
distracting them from pursuing the more severe in-
fringements in ex officio and complaint cases. The neces-
sary concentration of competition authorities' activity on
the important cases would risk not to be ensured.
" Third, maintaining the Commission's exemption mo-
nopoly would continue to block effective participation of
national authorities and courts in the enforcement of
EC competition law. And even if the Commission
shared its exemption power with the national authori-
ties, national courts would remain blocked and the effec-
tiveness of private enforcement impaired. In fact, the
extension of Article 4(2) would even strengthen the
blocking effect against national courts. Outside Article
4(2), national courts can today safely apply Article 81 (1)
if no notification has been made at all, or at least for the
time before a notification was made. With the general-
ization of Article 4(2), the prospect that a notification
might come at some later point in time and lead to an
5. Council Regulation No. 1216/1999/EC, O.J. L 148/5 (1999).
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exemption taking effect from the concluding day of the
agreement would discourage national courts even more
from applying Article 81(1).
Finally, as far as simplification of procedures is con-
cerned, the important point is that this becomes interest-
ing only after the central features of the enforcement
system concerning the concentration on the severe in-
fringements and the involvement of national authorities
and courts have been put right. Otherwise, more effi-
cient procedures would just attract more notifications
without improving the protection of competition.
C. The New System Proposed by the Commission's White Paper
All the above-stated reasons taken together have led the
Commission to conclude that a more far-reaching reform is nec-
essary. To this end, the White Paper proposes a new system,
which is based on the direct applicability of the exception in Ar-
ticle 81(3). The transition would be achieved by a new Council
Regulation replacing Regulation No. 17 and providing that the
Commission, national competition authorities, and national
courts in all proceedings for the application of Article 81(1)
would also consider Article 81 (3) and apply this provision where
its four conditions are fulfilled. Article 81 would thus become a
unitary norm, directly applicable in its entirety and composed of
a rule establishing the principle of prohibition under paragraph
1 and a legal exception under paragraph 3. Without the need
for an explicit administrative authorization, restrictive agree-
ments would be valid as long as they fulfilled the four conditions
under Article 81(3). The Commission, national competition au-
thorities, and national courts would have parallel competence
for the application of Article 81 in its entirety. Since 1958, this is
already the case in respect of Article 82.
We believe that this is the model that is best suited to the
European Union of the future and which meets our reform
objectives most certainly. In short, it improves the protection of
competition by allowing the Commission and national competi-
tion authorities to concentrate on the serious infringements,
and by fully involving national authorities and courts in the ap-
plication of the European competition rules. It benefits industry
by simplifying administrative control through the abolition of
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the notification procedure and by promoting the application of
one set of rules-the EC rules- to cases with an effect on trade
between Member States. And it can ensure-as I will show-
consistent application of these rules and an adequate level of
legal security for industry.
III. DETAILS OF THE COMMISSION'S REFORM MODEL
Let me now expand a little more on the details of our pro-
posal and its advantages.
A. Our Proposal Is Based on Four Pillars
The first pillar is the abolition of the notification and au-
thorization system in respect of Article 81. In the new system,
there will be no authority, whether Community or national, to
which restrictive agreements will have to be notified and which
issues decisions creating rights for companies, i.e., constitutive
exemptions. Instead, if restrictive agreements fulfill the four
conditions of Article 81(3), then they will be legal as from the
date of their conclusion and for as long as the four conditions
continue to be met. This means not only that the Commission's
exemption monopoly will disappear, but also that the power and
the necessity to issue exemption decisions-instead of being
shared between the Commission and national authorities-will
be abolished altogether. This avoids the problems of allocating
notifications between national competition authorities and the
Commission. It also means that the related danger of laxist ap-
plication of Article 81(3) by national authorities is eliminated, as
formal exemption decisions will no longer exist. Protection of
competition will be improved by allowing both the Commission
and national authorities fully to concentrate on serious infringe-
ments.
The second pillar is that as a result of the direct applicability
of Article 81(3), both national competition authorities and na-
tional courts will be enabled to participate fully in the enforce-
ment of EC competition rules. There will be full parallel compe-
tence of the Commission, national competition authorities, and
national courts in respect of the application of Articles 81 and
82. As well as the Commission, national authorities pursuing an
ex officio or complaint procedure, and national courts having to
decide upon the validity of an agreement and possibly about
20001 759
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damages, will all be able to decide themselves whether Article
81(3) applies and act accordingly. Thus, their procedures will
be expedited, and this will further enhance the protection of
competition.
Closer co-operation between national competition authori-
ties and the Commission within a future network of competition
authorities throughout the European Union is the third pillar of
our proposal. Ensuring efficiency and coherence calls for the
creation of such a network. Today, the Commission can co-oper-
ate more easily and more closely with U.S enforcement agencies
than with those within the European Union. We need to put an
end to this unsatisfactory situation.
Lastly, the shift to a system of enforcement based on ex post
control of restrictive agreements requires a strengthening of the
instruments at the Commission's disposal. For example, we pro-
pose to strengthen the Commission's power of inquiry by al-
lowing it to interview individuals at Commission offices and take
minuted statements. The penalties for the provision of incorrect
or misleading information also need to be updated. They have
not been changed since 1962 and we propose that they should
be aligned on those in the Merger Regulation.6
In the proposed new system, complaints will play a much
more important role in detecting and repressing serious in-
fringements. Therefore, it is necessary to simplify and improve
the procedures for handling complaints. That is why we propose
to introduce a time limit of four months within which the Com-
mission must indicate whether it proposes to conduct a substan-
tive investigation. It is essential that complainants are told rap-
idly of the Commission's intentions. Where the Commission
does not intend to investigate, complainants will be able to turn
to national competition authorities and/or national courts. We
do not propose a time limit for the substantive investigation of
complaints. Such a time limit would make little sense as the
complexity and nature of antitrust investigations vary widely. We
also propose to adopt a notice on complaints. This notice would
serve a number of purposes. First, it would provide guidance to
6. Council Regulation No. 4064/89/EEC on the control of concentrations be-
tween undertakings, O.J. L 395/1 (1989), corrected version in O.J. L 257/13 (1990),
amended by Council Regulation No.1310/97, O.J. L 180/1 (1997), corrigendum O.J. L 40/
17 (1998).
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complainants on the criteria to be used to determine which mat-
ters should best be dealt with by the Commission and which by
national competition authorities or courts respectively. Sec-
ondly, it would explain the remedies that a complainant can
hope for from the Commission, that is, an order requiring an
infringement to be put to an end, fines for the perpetrators, and
interim measures in cases of urgency. Meanwhile, damages and
findings of nullity of agreements remain within the sole compe-
tence of national courts.
B. The Competences of Commission, National Competition
Authorities, and National Courts in the New System
1. The Commission
In the new system, EC competition policy will continue to
be determined by the Commission. As guardian of the EC
Treaty and guarantor of the Community interest under the su-
pervision of the European Court ofJustice ("ECJ"), the Commis-
sion will have to play a special role in orientating competition
policy and ensuring the consistent application of the competi-
tion rules. To this end, the Commission will develop the legisla-
tive framework surrounding Articles 81 and 82, and it will issue
leading decisions in individual cases.
In a system of directly applicable exception, it will be crucial
to reinforce the legislative framework comprising block exemp-
tion regulations, notices, and guidelines. This is essential for en-
suring uniformity and coherence in the application of the rules
by different decision makers and it will provide foreseeability for
economic operators. The Commission will retain exclusive com-
petence for formulating, proposing, and in some instances
adopting these different forms of legislative texts. Block exemp-
tion regulations are directly applicable laws that national compe-
tition authorities and national courts will have to respect when
they apply European/national competition law. Notices and
guidelines, in which the Commission explains its policy, will pro-
vide orientation for national decision makers.
At this point, the connection with the reform of our policy
concerning vertical restraints becomes clear. In this area, we
have already begun to strengthen and clarify the legal frame-
work and to adopt a more economic approach. The current sec-
2000]
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tor-specific regulations 7 will be replaced by one broad block ex-
emption regulation covering all vertical restraints, except for car
distribution.' The draft of the new regulation, which we have
published for comments in September 1999,' foresees that all
vertical agreements up to a market share of thirty percent 0 will
be exempted, except for a limited number of "blacklisted" hard
core restraints. The new regulation would therefore only define
which type of restriction is not exempted. We would thus over-
come the legalistic form-based approach that characterizes the
current regulations and which has a straitjacket effect by at-
tempting to define all clauses that are exempted. The aim of
market share-based block exemptions is to provide a safe harbor
for all those companies not holding significant market power.
Within this safe harbor, they will no longer be obliged to ex-
amine the legality and validity of their agreements. Above the
market share threshold, vertical agreements will not be pre-
sumed to be illegal, and Commission guidelines will help compa-
nies to assess the compatibility of their agreements with Article
81 (1) and 81(3). Consequently, in September 1999 we have also
published draft guidelines on vertical restraints for comments by
third parties.'1 The aim is to adopt the new block exemption
regulation before the end of the year 1999 and to start applying
it together with the guidelines from June 1, 2000.12
7. Commission Regulation No. 1983/83/EEC on the application of Article 81(3)
of the EC Treaty to categories of exclusive distribution agreements, O.J. L 173/1
(1983), corrigendum O.J. L 281/24 (1983); Commission Regulation No. 1984/83/EEC
on the application of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty to categories of exclusive purchas-
ing agreements, O.J. L 173/5 (1983), corrigendum OJ. L 281/24 (1983); Commission
Regulation No. 4087/88/EEC on the application of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty to
categories of franchise agreements, OJ. L 359/46 (1988).
8. Council Regulation No. 1475/95/EC on the application of Article 81 (3) of the
EC Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements,
O.J. L 145/25 (1995), will expire on September 30, 2002.
9. O.J. C 270/7 (1999).
10. The market share cap refers to the 30% share held by the supplier in the rele-
vant market on which he sells the contract goods or services, or-in case of exclusive
supply obligations- the 30% share held by the buyer in the relevant market on which
he purchases the contract goods or services.
11. O.J. C 270/12 (1999).
12. In fact, the new block exemption regulation was adopted on December 22,
1999 (Commission Regulation No 2790/1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the
EC Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, O.J. L 336/21
(1999)). The final version maintains all basic features of the draft regulation as pub-
lished on September 30, 1999. The new regulation stipulates that the exemptions pro-
vided for in Commission Regulations Nos. 1983/83/EEC, 1984/83/EEC, and 4087/88/
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In the same spirit of strengthening and clarifying the legal
framework and providing better orientation for industry, we
have also started the overhaul of our policy with regard to hori-
zontal restraints. This will lead to the presentation of new draft
block exemption regulations and guidelines in the course of the
year 2000.
Apart from the legislative framework, the Commission will
concentrate on combating serious infringements by individual
prohibition decisions. These will set precedents, shape Euro-
pean competition policy, and provide further orientation for na-
tional decision makers. It is still under discussion whether under
certain exceptional cases, the Commission would also adopt
non-infringement decisions, stating that a certain agreement
does not infringe Article 81 because it is not even caught by the
prohibition in paragraph 1 or because it is covered by the excep-
tion in paragraph 3. However, in contrast to the constitutive ex-
emption decisions in the current system, non-infringement deci-
sions would be declaratory only. Non-infringement decisions are
not meant to satisfy individual companies' request for legal se-
curity. The Commission would issue them in the public interest
exclusively, in particular where an agreement raises questions
that are new and where, in the interest of ensuring legal clarity
and coherent application of the rules, it seems sensible to pro-
vide the other decisions makers, as well as economic operators,
with guidance regarding the Commission's approach. Non-in-
fringement decisions would therefore not push the Commission
back into its reactive role but could be one of the instruments it
would employ in leading a pro-active competition policy.
Another instrument will be decisions by which the Commis-
sion accepts commitments given by companies in order to pre-
vent a prohibition decision from being issued against them.
Those decisions will render commitments binding upon the par-
ties and enable third parties to rely on them in national courts.
Commitments would be offered by the parties concerned or
EEC shall continue to apply until May 31, 2000. FromJune 1, 2000, the new regulation
will apply until its expiry on May 31, 2010. The prohibition laid down in Article 81 (1)
EC Treaty shall not apply during the period from June 1, 2000 to December 31, 2001 in
respect of agreements already in force on May 31, 2000 that do not satisfy the condi-
tions for exemption provided for in the new regulation but which satisfy the conditions
for exemption provided for in Regulations Nos. 1983/83/EEC, 1984/83/EEC, and
4087/88/EEC.
20001
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would be proposed by the Commission. In practice, securing
commitments would provide possibilities of fine tuning similar
to the fine tuning currently exercised where an exemption deci-
sion is subjected to conditions and obligations.
2. National Competition Authorities
Successful involvement of national competition authorities
in the enforcement of EC competition rules in the first place
obviously depends on them being empowered by their Member
States to apply Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty. In the last twelve
months, the score has not changed: eight Member States have
empowered their authorities,13 while seven have not.1 4 As the
Commission's exemption monopoly seems to have been the
main ground for the remaining seven Member States not to em-
power their authorities, we have reason to expect that this will
change once our proposed reform is implemented. In fact,
some countries, such as Sweden and Denmark, are already antic-
ipating our reform by preparing new legislation empowering
their competition authorities to apply Articles 81 and 82.
In the new system, Commission and national competition
authorities will cooperate in a close network characterized by
shared principles and the development of a common competi-
tion culture. The need for a common competition culture can-
not be overstated and I believe that this will be key for the
smooth functioning of the network, which in turn will be deci-
sive for the success of our reform model. In particular, uniform
and coherent application of the rules and the development of a
level playing field throughout the European Union will depend
to a large extent on the functioning of the network. I will come
back to this point.
Once empowered to apply Articles 81 and 82, national au-
thorities will be able to issue the same types of decision as the
Commission, i.e., prohibition decisions, decisions accepting com-
mitments or rejecting complaints, and interim measures deci-
sions. Moreover, national authorities will have the power to
withdraw the benefit of a group exemption regulation if agree-
13. These states are: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portu-
gal, and Spain.
14. These states are: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom.
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ments covered by that regulation on a separate national market
create restrictions of competition that are incompatible with Ar-
ticle 81 (3). With effect from June 18, 1999, we have already cre-
ated this withdrawal possibility with regard to all existing block
exemption regulations in the area of vertical restraints. 15
3. National Courts
Full involvement of national courts in the application of Ar-
ticles 81 and 82 in their entirety is one of the advantages of the
Commission's reform model. Direct applicability of Article
81(3) will enable national courts to decide themselves, and im-
mediately, upon enforceability or nullity of an agreement, as well
as on damages.
Since we published our proposals for reform in April 1999,
some commentators have questioned a judges' ability to apply
Article 81(3) in the appropriate way. I think concerns in this
respect are not really justified for several reasons: First of all, the
reinforced legal framework surrounding the EC competition
rules, which I mentioned earlier, will provide judges with orien-
tation especially with regard to Article 81(3). Judges will also
retain the possibility to put economic, legal, and technical ques-
tions to the Commission, and finally they will have the possibility
to refer to the European Court ofJustice for a preliminary ruling
under Article 234 (ex Article 177). Moreover, it is conceivable
to improve further a judge's ability to apply competition law by
special training programs or by encouraging Member States to
consider the creation of specialized courts with responsibility for
competition matters.
A decisive point is that Article 81 (3) only provides a margin
of appreciation with regard to the fulfillment of the four condi-
tions for the exception; it does not leave a margin of discretion
whether to apply Article 81(3), if the four conditions are ful-
filled.' 6 If they are fulfilled, then the decision maker, whether
15. Council Regulation No. 1215/1999/EC amending Council Regulation No.19/
65/EEC, O.J. L 148/1 (1999). This amendment also applies to the new vertical re-
straints block exemption Regulation No 2790/1999/EC, O.J. L 336/21 (1999).
16. Ancides v. Commission, Case 43/85, [1987] E.C.R. 3131; Sch6ller Lebensmittel
GmbH v. Commission, Case T-9/39, [1995] ECR 11-1611, 11-1663, 140; Soci~t6
d'Hygi Vichy, Case T-19/91, [1992] E.C.R. 11-415, 11-456, 99; Matra Hachette SA v.
Commission, Case T-17/93, [1994] E.C.R. 11-595, 11-631, 11-633, 11-637, 11-641, 11-644, II-
649, 104, 111, 125, 134, 140, 156. Some other judgments by the European Court of
2000]
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authority or court, has to apply the exception and therefore has
to disapply the prohibition. 17 Article 81(3) is therefore not a
norm of discretion, the application of which is usually reserved
to administrative authorities. It compares to Articles 81(1) and
82, which also require complex economic assessments, and
which have always been directly applied by national courts.
Moreover, the European Court of Justice 8 has already acknowl-
edged that national judges are capable of assessing the
probability of exemption under Article 81(3) and to draw the
appropriate conclusions for their procedure, for instance in in-
terim measures decisions.
4. Case Allocation in the New System
In the new system, complainants will be able to choose
freely whether to turn to the Commission, a national competi-
tion authority, or a national court. In the relationship between
competition authorities, an important function of the network
between the Commission and national authorities will be to de-
velop transparent and flexible rules of allocating cases to the au-
thority best placed to deal with them. This authority can ensure
the best protection of competition in any particular case. It nec-
essarily does not have to be either the Commission or one single
national competition authority alone. In certain cases, it is con-
ceivable that joint action by two national authorities might be
the most appropriate solution.
The center of gravity of the restrictive effects certainly will
remain a criterion for case allocation, but will lose much of its
rigidity upon the abolition of the notification and authorization
system. In a system that concentrates on prohibition decisions,
Justice (e.g., Metro v. Commission, Case 26/76, [1977] E.C.R. 1875, 1916, 45) and by
the Court of First Instance (e.g., Kraanverhuur, Joined Cases T-213/95 & T-18/96,
[1997] E.C.R. 11-1739, 11-1810, 190) refer to the Commission's "discretion" when ap-
plying Article 81 (3). The context of each of these judgements, however, makes clear
that what is meant is a margin of appreciation in assessing the four requirements under
Article 81(3), not a margin of discretion that would allow the Commission to use polit-
ical or any other considerations for not applying Article 81(3) where it had previously
concluded that all four requirements of this provision were fulfilled.
17. Consten & Grundig v. Commission, Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, [1966] E.C.R.
299, (1966] C.M.L.R. 418; Peugeot v. Commission, Case T-23/90, [1991] E.C.R. 11-653,
[1993] 5 C.M.L.R. 540.
18. Delimitis v. Henninger Br~u, Case C-234/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-935, 1-991-994,
43-55 (in particular 50), [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 210, 257.
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in order to stop a restrictive agreement-the effects of which are
not centered in just one Member State-it may suffice to have it
prohibited by a national authority in just one Member State.
Other criteria for case allocation will include inter alia the effec-
tiveness of investigative powers and legal means for settling the
case, sanctions available, or particular Community interest.
Potential complainants will need guidance in order to avoid
unnecessary rejections of their complaint, and in identifying the
authority that is most likely to take up their complaint and pro-
vide adequate remedies. Therefore, we need to set out the rem-
edies that can be obtained from the Commission and also to ex-
plain the concept of lack of Community interest under which
the Commission is entitled to set priorities and reject com-
plaints.19 We intend to address these issues in a Commission No-
tice. Ideally, in order to provide complainants with a full picture
and the opportunity to compare fora, the conditions under
which national authorities and national courts take up com-
plaints, and the remedies they can provide should also be ex-
plained.
Finally, if after a procedure has started in one authority, an-
other authority later turns out to be better placed to deal with
the matter, case transfer should be possible. This will mainly
take place on a voluntary basis, except for the Commission's
power to withdraw a case from a national authority at any time.
We are still discussing whether case transfer should be possible,
not only vertically between the Commission and a national au-
thority, but also horizontally between national competition au-
thorities. In any event, efficiency demands that where case trans-
fer takes place, the whole file including all confidential informa-
tion can be transferred and that all the evidence contained in it
can be directly used by the recipient authority. In this respect,
many obstacles still need to be overcome at the EC level as well
as at the national level. In particular, national provisions prohib-
iting the transfer of information to foreign and international au-
thorities would need to be removed. Moreover, certain basic
safeguards for the non-disclosure of the information transferred,
and for its use only for the purpose for which it was collected,
would have to be established throughout the Community.
19. Automec v. Commission, Case T-24/90, [1992] E.C.R. 11-2223, 11-2277-2284,
84 et seq, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 177, 1198.
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IV. ADVANTAGES OF THE NEW SYSTEM FOR INDUSTRY
Let me now briefly mention some important advantages of
the new system for industry: first, the reform will improve the
protection of competition and thereby increase the welfare of
society inside the internal market. Effective competition is es-
sential for the creation and maintenance of an open market
economy. It is the key not only to increasing the competitiveness
of European companies inside the Community but also for
globalizing international markets. It is moreover the only guar-
antor that consumers will get the best value and service at low
prices. This is the main objective of the whole reform.
Second, abolishing the notification and authorization sys-
tem will free companies from unnecessary bureaucratic burdens
and delays. This means deregulation and simplification. Third,
by allowing national competition authorities and national courts
to decide upon Article 81 in its entirety, the blocking effect of
the Commission's exemption monopoly is removed. As a conse-
quence, the new system will more rapidly produce binding re-
sults concerning the legality and validity of agreements.
Fourth, pressure on national competition systems for con-
vergence will grow. This will promote the development of a level
playing field and the application of one set of rules-the EC
competition rules-in all cases affecting trade between Member
States. Legally, the abolition of the notification and authoriza-
tion system at the Community level will not oblige Member
States to abandon similar systems at the national level. Also, the
principle of primacy of EC law over national law remains un-
touched. In practice, however, the combination of primacy of
EC law with direct applicability of Article 81(3) by national au-
thorities and national courts, and the extended use of directly
applicable EC block exemption regulations, will increase the
convergence pressure for national competition systems.
V. CRITICISM EXPRESSED AGAINST THE NEW SYSTEM
Let me finally turn to a number of objections raised against
the new system.
A. Compatibility of the Commission's Reform Model with the
EC Treaty
It is sometimes alleged that our reform model is not com-
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patible with the EC Treaty and that moving to a system of di-
rectly applicable exceptions could not be achieved on the basis
of a new implementing Council Regulation, but would require
an amendment of the EC Treaty. In particular, it is said that the
wording of Article 81 (3), i.e., the phrase "may be declared inap-
plicable" presupposes a constitutive administrative declaration,
thus ruling out the direct applicability of this norm by national
courts.
We do not agree with this view. It is uncontested that, in
1957, the authors of the EC Treaty could not agree whether re-
strictive agreements should be controlled by a notification and
authorization system or by a system in which the exception rule
under Article 81(3) is directly applicable. Therefore, Article
81(3) was based on the compromise formulation "may be de-
clared inapplicable" in order to allow the establishment of either
system. Had the authors of the EC Treaty opted for an adminis-
trative authorization system, the formulation would rather have
been like in Article 65 of the Treaty establishing the European
Coal and Steel Community: "the Commission shall authorise."
The choice of enforcement system was thus left to the Council of
Europe ("Council") when adopting the implementing regula-
tion on the basis of Article 83. This provision empowers the
Council inter alia to lay down detailed rules for the application of
Article 81(3), taking into account the need to ensure effective
supervision and simplification of administration. Article 83 does
not prescribe the establishment of a particular type of system for
the implementation of Articles 81 or 82. It allows the Council to
empower, not only the Commission, but also national authorities
and courts to apply Article 81(3). Within this framework, the
Council in 1962, with regard to the control of restrictive agree-
ments, chose to establish via Regulation No. 17 the current cen-
tralized notification and authorization system, in which the Com-
mission has exclusive power to grant exemptions under Article
81(3). For the sake of ensuring effective protection of competi-
tion and simplification of control procedures in circumstances
that have fundamentally changed since 1962, we think that it is
now time to propose to the Council to abandon its previous
choice and to establish the alternative system of a directly appli-
cable exception via a new implementing regulation based on Ar-
ticle 83 of the EC Treaty.
Finally, as I have already indicated, Article 81(3) is of a na-
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ture to be applied directly by national courts. This is because
this provision is unconditional and sufficiently clear, and most
importantly, it only contains a margin of appreciation, leaving
no margin of political discretion not to apply it once its four
conditions are fulfilled.
B. Effectiveness of Competition Protection
Some commentators on our reform proposal fear that the
reform would weaken the protection of competition by degrad-
ing the prohibition principle to an abuse control system. In this
regard, I want to re-state firmly that improving the protection of
competition is the main objective of the reform. We intend to
achieve this in the following way: first, the prohibition principle
and its preventive effect will be fully maintained. Restrictive
agreements not covered by Article 81 (3) will be void ab initio and
will therefore-unlike in an abuse control system-not enjoy
provisional validity before an authority or court has intervened.
Second, there will not be a defacto degradation of competi-
tion protection to the level of abuse control either. On the con-
trary: the practical effectiveness of the prohibition principle will
be re-enforced. On the one hand, resources will be concen-
trated on pursuing the serious infringements. On the other
hand, national competition authorities and courts will fully and
more effectively participate in the enforcement of Articles 81
and 82 in their entirety. They will be able to activate fully their
specific strengths based on the fact that they are closer to their
citizens and have special remedies at their disposal. Finally, the
abolition of the notification system will eliminate immunity from
fines, which are conditional upon notification. Overall, the new
system will increase the deterrent effect of the prohibition rule
so as to better protect competition.
C. Uniform and Coherent Application of EC Law
Compared to the current system, the decisive element of
our reform model is the proposal to extend the direct applicabil-
ity of Article 81(1) to Article 81(3) and thus to create parallel
competencies for the Commission, national competition author-
ities, and national courts in the application of Article 81 as a
whole. In comparison with the Commission's exemption mo-
nopoly, the new system could therefore give rise to new risks for
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the uniform and coherent application of Article 81(3). How-
ever, in the first place, the practical risk of divergent decision
making should not be overstated. Article 81 (1) and Article 82
have already for several decades been subject to parallel compe-
tencies for the Commission, national authorities, and national
courts, and very few problems have arisen.
The risk of divergent decision making will be further re-
duced by the strengthening of the legal framework surrounding
Article 81, as well as by key Commission decisions that will fur-
ther clarify the application of this provision. Moreover, our con-
cept relies on special mechanisms to avoid conflicting decisions,
and finally on clear principles for the resolution of conflicts if
they arise. Prevention of conflicts will mainly be based on inten-
sive information and consultation between the Commission and
national authorities in all procedures for the application of EC
law. The Commission will thus be aware of these procedures
and be able to identify and settle difficulties of interpretation
and gaps in the legislative framework. The Commission will also
continue to answer questions of a technical, economic, and legal
nature put by the national courts. With the permission of a na-
tional court, the Commission should also be empowered to in-
tervene in judicial proceedings as amicus curiae.
According to the judgment of the European Court ofJustice
("ECJ") in the case of Delimitis,0 national courts are obliged to
avoid conflict with decisions that the Commission is preparing
on the basis of Article 81. In these circumstances, the national
court is called upon to suspend its procedure and ask the Com-
mission for further information on the case, or ask the ECJ for a
preliminary ruling. The obligation to avoid conflict must aforti-
or/ also apply to decisions that the Commission has already
adopted. Moreover, it results from the loyalty requirement in
Article 10 of the EC Treaty that this obligation also extends to
national competition authorities.
In the relation between national competition authorities
and the Commission, the most important aspect is the establish-
ment of a close network designed to develop a uniform enforce-
ment practice and a common competition culture. This will re-
duce the scope for divergence. A feature of the network could
20. Delimitis, [1991] E.C.R. 1-935, 1-991-994, 43-55 (in particular 47), [1992] 5
C.M.L.R. 210, 257.
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for example be an upgrading of the Advisory Committee into a
forum for discussing all important EC law cases. As a last resort
for avoiding divergence, the Commission would keep the
power-similar to the current Article 9(3) Regulation No. 17-
to withdraw a case from a national authority at any time.
In the light of these different preventive mechanisms, we
expect only a limited number of divergences to arise in the new
system. The resolution of these conflicts will follow from the
role and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. In
particular, the national courts' obligation to avoid conflict with
Commission decisions as well as the clarifying effect of prelimi-
nary rulings by the ECJ will come into operation wherever a deci-
sion by a national competition authority or by a lower civil law
court is being appealed in an administrative court or a higher
civil law court, like for any other direct application of EC law.
For decisions by national courts with which the Commission
does not agree, this means that in case of "negative" judgments,
e.g., non-enforcement of an agreement, or award of damages,
the Commission will normally leave it to the parties concerned
to appeal to a higher court of law. According to the principle set
out in the Delimitis case, this appellate court would have to avoid
conflict with existing Commission decisions.
The appellate court could ask the ECJ for a preliminary rul-
ing and, as the last instance, it would be obliged to do so. The
Commission systematically presents its opinion to the ECJ in all
preliminary ruling procedures. In case of "positive" judgments
by a national court, because the agreement is either considered
not to be restrictive or to be covered by Article 81(3), the Com-
mission can still prohibit this agreement with effect erga omnes. 1
Where the judgment of the national court was appealed, the
appellate court would then, according to the Delimitis principle,
be obliged to avoid conflict with the Commission decision.
Where the judgment had already become definitive before the
Commission issued its decision, the principle of res judicata
21. See "Ice cream case (Unilever/Mars)" case (Masterfoods Ltd v. HB Ice Cream Ltd,
and HB Ice Cream Ltd v Masterfoods Ltd trading as Mars Ireland, Case C-344/98, refer-
ence to the ECJ for preliminary ruling, not yet decided) in which a national court (the
Irish High Court) on May 28, 1992 had found that Articles 81 (1) and 82 did not apply
while the Commission on March 11, 1998 adopted a prohibition decision (O.J. L 246/1
(1998) based on Articles 81 (1) and 82 (appealed against in HB Ice Cream Ltd v Com-
mission, Case T-65/98, not yet decided).
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would only cover the parties to the litigation. For the rest, the
subsequent Commission decision would apply.
If, in spite of the network and the Commission's power to
withdraw a case, a national competition authority manages to
take a decision with which the Commission disagrees, then it will
in the first place be up to the companies concerned to appeal to
a court of law. This court will again have to observe the princi-
ple laid down in Delimitis to avoid conflict with existing Commis-
sion decisions. Finally, a reference for a preliminary ruling will
clarify matters with the authority of the European Court of Jus-
tice.
Let me finally add a word on forum shopping. It is often
alleged that the new system of parallel competencies would in-
vite complainants to move from one national court to the next,
or from one national competition authority to the next, until a
court or authority is found which considers Article 81(3) to be
inapplicable and thus prohibits the agreement, or rules that it is
void and possibly awards damages. This would endanger the via-
bility of contracts or networks of similar contracts covering sev-
eral Member States.
It is important to stress that forum shopping only makes
sense to the extent to which complainants can hope for diver-
gent decision practice by the Commission, national authorities,
and national courts. Therefore, our most important safeguards
are all the measures and mechanisms designed to ensure uni-
formity and coherence, which I just explained. Moreover, with
regard to national courts, the Brussels Convention of 1968,22
which applies in all Member States of the European Union, and
the Lugano Convention of 198823 applying to all Member States
of the European Economic Area,2 4 further add to the control of
forum shopping. According to these conventions, the complain-
ant's choice of where to sue is in most cases limited to two fora:
first, the national court where the defendant has his business
seat; and second, for contractual litigation, the national court
where the contractual obligation is to be executed; or for third
parties seeking damages, the national court where the damage
22. 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments
in civil and commercial matters (consolidated version), O.J. C 27/1 (1998).
23. Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters-Done at Lugano on 16 September 1988, OJ. L 319/9 (1988).
24. Agreement on the European Economic Area, O.J. L 1/1-606 (1994).
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accrued. As long as litigation in one national court continues,
other national courts will not admit an action concerning the
same parties and the same object. Once a national court's judg-
ment has become non-appealable (resjudicata), thatjudgment is
executable inter partes in all European Union/European Eco-
nomic Area Member States and has to be recognized inter partes
by all national courts throughout the European Union/Euro-
pean Economic Area. Finally, a clause on arbitration or deter-
mining the place ofjurisdiction (the forum) and the applicable
substantive law is common practice in most business contracts.
D. An Adequate Level of Legal Certainty
Ensuring an adequate level of legal certainty for industry is
also one of the goals of our reform proposal. There are two
levels of legal security: first, there is the one that the European
Court ofJustice has confirmed, i.e., the need to avoid conflicting
decisions in a system of parallel competencies. 25 That is a seri-
ous and legitimate interest of companies with which I have dealt
already. The second aspect of legal certainty put forward by
companies is the claim of an individual right to go to an author-
ity in order to get confirmation of whether an individual agree-
ment conforms with the law. This latter aspect is questionable
and not the normal rule in a legal system. Surely, there is an
obligation for authorities to make the rules as predictable as pos-
sible, but outside of a system of either generalized ex ante control
or a system of exemption monopoly, there should not be a right
to get a decision on each individual agreement as to its compati-
bility with the rules.
In addition, the current system does not produce legal se-
curity of the latter kind to any great extent. More than ninety-
five percent of all notifications for exemption do not end with a
formal decision but rather with a simple comfort letter26 that is
not binding for other decision makers and therefore does not
protect companies against different assessments by national au-
thorities or national courts. On the other hand, forty years of
decisional practice by the Commission and the European Court
of Justice have to a large extent clarified the interpretation of
25. See, e.g., Delimitis, [1991] ECR 1-935.
26. In the last five years (1994-1998), the Commission has on average issued five
formal exemption decisions and 173 comfort letters per year.
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Articles 81(1) and 81(3) so that, also in this respect, it does not
seem necessary to maintain the notification and authorization
system.
We think that the proposed new system will even increase
legal security in various respects. In the first place, the system of
directly applicable exceptions automatically will legalize the
huge number of agreements that-despite the fact that they
meet the four conditions for exemption under Article 81(3)-
have not been notified because companies wanted to avoid costs,
delays, and other inconveniences. Under the current system
these agreements are void for the bureaucratic reason of not
having been notified to and exempted by the Commission.
In the second place, we intend to make the rules still clearer
by issuing a new type of broader block exemption regulations
that will be binding on national decision makers and which will
furthermore be accompanied by guidelines, as well as by leading
decisions in individual cases. We will also continue on the path
to a more economic approach in our analysis, thereby reducing
the likelihood of being caught by the prohibition under Article
81(1) and overcoming the form-based legalistic approach that
characterizes our current block exemption regulations. As I
have explained, we are already well advanced on this path in the
area of vertical restraints and are preparing to take a similar
route with regard to horizontal restraints. The forthcoming new
block exemption regulation on vertical restraints, with its thirty
percent market share cap, will exempt about eighty percent of
all vertical agreements and in practice cover nearly all agree-
ments concluded by small and medium-sized enterprises. For
them, the concern of legal certainty is much more justified than
for large companies.
Self-assessment in the new system will be mainly a task for
large companies, who have access to expert legal advice. In this
context, it is important to stress that, above the market share
caps of the new regulations, agreements will not be deemed ille-
gal, and that Commission guidelines will help companies to as-
sess their position under Articles 81(1) and 81(3). Moreover,
individual Commission decisions in leading cases will comple-
ment the existing body of case law that provides further orienta-
tion for self-assessment. These decisions will mainly be prohibi-
tions.
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With regard to imposing fines for substantive infringe-
ments, the only change will be the abolition of the immunity
from fines that was connected with notification. Apart from
that, the Commission's fining practice will not change. This
means that hard core infringements will continue to be systemat-
ically fined. Other serious infringements in the so-called "gray
area" will attract fines only if the prohibition of the conduct in
question had previously been made clear by a precedent case, by
the legislative framework, or by other official publications such
as the Commission's Annual Report on Competition Policy.
We also have to stress that the current notification system is
appreciated only by a limited number of companies and for a
limited number of agreements, while large parts of industry al-
ready rely on self-assessment and no longer notify their exempt-
able agreements. Those companies will gain in a system of di-
rectly applicable exceptions that automatically legalizes such
agreements from the day of their conclusion.
Nevertheless, we are currently discussing whether and to
what extent it would be appropriate for the Commission to en-
gage in a practice of issuing informal opinions, i.e., some
equivalent of the business review letters employed in the U.S.
system, with regard to the compatibility of individual transac-
tions with Articles 81 and 82. Should we go down this path, how-
ever, it will be vital for the success of our reform, and in particu-
lar our ability to concentrate on the serious infringements and
to set our own agenda, that the Commission retains full discre-
tion about whether and to what extent to react to individual re-
quests for opinions. Moreover, it must be clear that opinions
would only self-bind the Commission as long as no new facts
arise. Towards national courts and competition authorities,
Commission opinions would not be legally binding. Within the
network of competition authorities, however, and once the Com-
mission has issued a positive opinion about a certain conduct, it
would be logical for it to prevent national authorities from
prohibiting that conduct as long as no new facts are revealed.
The consultation processes within the network, and ultimately
the power to withdraw a case from a national authority, give the
Commission sufficient instruments to do so.
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CONCLUSIONS
To conclude, I want to stress once more the main objectives
and features of the proposed reform. The reform pursues three
main objectives:
* First, a more efficient protection of competition;
" Second, a less bureaucratic enforcement system;
" Third, a more level playing field for companies operat-
ing inside the Community.
The means to achieve these objectives are:
* First, the abolition of the notification and prior authori-
zation system so as to allow the Commission and national
competition authorities to concentrate their resources
on the important and problematic cases in order to pro-
tect effective competition.
* Second, the participation of national competition au-
thorities and national courts in the enforcement of Arti-
cles 81 and 82 in their entirety, thereby increasing the
effectiveness and the deterrent effect of these rules.
* Third, greater impact of the rule of primacy of Commu-
nity competition law by rendering Article 81(3) directly
applicable and by strongly promoting the application of
one set of rules instead of fifteen, and tomorrow twenty,
twenty-five or even thirty different national standards.
I am convinced that this reform is beneficial for the Community
as a whole, for companies and consumers alike, and I am there-
fore optimistic about the outcome of our White Paper.
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